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Introduction 
 
We have come 
along way in terms of equality law since Lord Davey 
made his statement. Not only was he unable or unwill-
ing to see the law as a vehicle for protecting individuals 
from discrimination in employment, he was also very 
definitely talking about a ‗workman‘ and the fact that this 
might be a woman had probably not occurred to him. 
Times and contexts have changed and the law now has 
a clear role to play in protecting individuals from dis-
crimination on a number of grounds. This Law in Brief 
summarises the legal framework relevant to gender 
equality in the employment sphere. This Law in Brief 
also acts as a background paper for a pilot research 
project looking at women‘s progression in the academic 
sector.
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The European Union Position 
 
Treaty provisions 
 
The European Union has been active in the field of gen-
der equality for quite some time. The rationale for pro-
moting gender equality however did initially at least not 
stem from concerns about equality between men and 
women or a desire to promote women‘s rights. Equality 
began with economic policy measures to ensure equal 
pay. Allowing Member States to pay women less than 
men would put 
those countries 
which already had 
equal pay legisla-
tion, (notably 
France at the 
time) at a com-
petitive disadvan-
tage compared to 
those who could 
otherwise take 
advantage of 
lower labour costs 
when employing 
women. The prin-
ciple of equal pay 
is enshrined in 
Article 141 of the 
EC Treaty. 
 
Article 141 however focuses on equal pay and does little 
to ensure gender equality more generally. Under Article 
13 there are now more general powers to implement 
measure to combat discrimination on a number of 
grounds including sex. 
 
Secondary Legislation 
 
Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation is one 
such measure. The directive covers 4 different types of 
discrimination recognised in European 
Law. Direct discrimination is defined 
as less favourable treatment on the 
grounds of sex; indirect discrimination 
as that relating to a person of one sex 
being put at a particular disadvantage 
by an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice. The Directive 
also covers harassment, defined as 
unwanted conduct violating the dignity 
of a person and sexual harassment 
which has a very similar definition to 
that of harassment but must contain 
conduct of a sexual nature. Victimisa-
tion in employment is also covered in 
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1. Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of 
equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or 
work of equal value is applied. 
2. For the purpose of this article, "pay" means the ordi-
nary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other con-
sideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker 
receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, 
from his employer. Equal pay without discrimination based 
on sex means: 
a. that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be cal-
culated on the basis of the same unit of measurement; 
b. that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the 
same job. 
… 
Article 13EC
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1. Without prejudice to the other provisions 
of this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.  
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the directive. 
 
Article 4 of the directive clearly outlaws any form of dis-
crimination in relation to all aspects and conditions of 
remuneration. Article 14 extends the right to non-
discrimination to access to employment and training and 
to working conditions. By virtue of article 15, women 
have the right to return to their jobs (or equivalent) fol-
lowing a period of maternity leave and article 16 makes 
provisions to protect parents from being discriminated 
against because of paternity or adoption leave periods. 
All of these provisions have now been transposed into 
UK law.  
 
The UK provisions 
 
Sex equality law in England and Wales, much of which 
is based on EU law, can be found in the Sex Discrimina-
tion Act 1975 (SDA) and Equal Pay Act 1970 (EPA) 
both as amended. While the provisions complement 
each other and are to be regarded as a coherent whole, 
the provisions are mutually exclusive. The EPA covers 
all matters relating to pay and conditions and the SDA 
covers those areas which fall outside of that remit. The 
SDA would for example include discrimination in relation 
to advertising positions, hiring or promotion.  
 
Equal Pay 
 
The EPA implies an ‗equality clause‘ into any employ-
ment contract ensuring there is no less favourable treat-
ment than the treatment a comparable person receives. 
A comparator is someone who is of the opposite sex 
and is employed on ‗like work‘ or rated as equivalent or 
on work of equal value. The equal pay legislation is in 
some respects more flexible than the SDA as no ad-
verse affect needs to be established. Sex discrimination 
is presumed if the complainant can show that a member 
of the opposite sex is being paid more for ‗like work‘.  
 
The main problems in relation to equal pay arise in rela-
tion to the definition of ‗like work or work of equal value‘. 
According to Capper Pass Ltd v Lawton [1976] IRLR 
366 ‗like work‘ need not be the same, broadly similar is 
sufficient and ‗trivial differences, or differences not likely 
in the real world to be reflected in the terms and condi-
tions of employment, ought to be disregarded.‘  
Work rated as equivalent in any job evaluation schemes 
must be paid at the same level. Where no job evaluation 
scheme has been carried out, an equal pay claim can 
still be brought on the basis that the work is of ‗equal 
value‘. Pickstone v Freemans plc [1988] ICR 697 HL is 
the key ruling in this context.  Mrs Pickstone, a ware-
house operative, claimed equal pay with a male com-
parator who was a ‗checker warehouse operative‘. There 
was also a man employed as a ‗warehouse operative‘. 
However the court held that a ‗token man‘ doing a par-
ticular job did not preclude an equal pay claim and the 
issue for the court is whether the work done by ‗checker 
warehouse operatives‘ is of equal value to that of 
‗warehouse operatives‘. 
 
The SDA provisions 
 
The SDA covers 4 forms of discrimination: Direct dis-
crimination, indirect discrimination, harassment and vic-
timisation. All 4 definitions follow the European defini-
tions and considered in turn below: 
 
Direct Discrimination 
 
Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one 
person is treated less favourably than another is, has 
been, or would be treated in a comparable situation on 
the grounds of sex. The law is based therefore on com-
paring the treatment of the victim with the treatment of 
others. This comparison must be between cases where 
the relevant circumstances are not materially different 
from each other and the comparator can be a hypotheti-
cal one.
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The reason or motive for the discrimination is irrelevant. 
The case of Moyhing v Barts & London NHS Trust 
[2006] IRLR 860 is a recent example from the employ-
ment sphere. In this case male nurses performing inti-
mate procedures on female patients had to be chaper-
oned. There was no equivalent requirement for 
female nurses. Whatever the justification, this 
still amounted to direct discrimination – the 
whole point of the legislation is not to treat 
women differently from men or treat one group 
as capable of doing something and the other 
group as not capable of doing the same thing. 
 
Discrimination is also unlawful when it occurs 
because of stereotyped ideas about the charac-
teristics of a particular group. It would render 
the legislation quite ineffective if this kind of 
discrimination was not unlawful. A useful illus-
tration is provided by  Horsey v Dyfed CC [1982] IRLR 
395. Mrs Horsey worked in Wales and when her hus-
band was offered a job in London,  applied for a second-
ment to London. It was refused on the basis that she 
was unlikely to return because women tend to follow 
their husband and go wherever he gets a job. This was 
held to amount to direct discrimination. 
 
2008/06 
Home Office v Bailey [2005] IRLR 369 
 
‗if a woman can point to a job being performed by a man on a higher 
rate of pay, which is the same job as she is performing or its equiva-
lent in value, the subsection seems simply to place the onus on the 
employer of proving that ―genuinely‖ there is a material difference 
which has nothing to do with the difference in sex…. I do not read the 
subsection… as imposing a two-stage process in which the woman 
having pointed to a higher paid man has some burden of establishing  
a prima facie case that there is discrimination, which then imposes 
and evidential burden on the employer to justify the factor.‘ 
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 All direct discrimination is automatically unlawful. It can-
not be justified unless it falls within the exceptions de-
fined as genuine occupational qualifications which are 
briefly considered below. 
 
Indirect discrimination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect discrimination occurs if a seemingly neutral pro-
vision affects one group more than another. This is a 
straightforward idea but the implementation of it has 
caused problems. One problem arises in relation to the 
definition of ‗provision, criterion or practice‘. In British 
Airways v Stamer [2005] IRLR 862 a female pilot asked 
to reduce her working hours to 50% of a full time posi-
tion after having her first baby. The request was refused 
and her employer argued that the refusal was not a pro-
vision criterion or practice but a one-off decision taken 
in this particular situation. The Employment Appeal Tri-
bunal disagreed and held that indirect sex discrimination 
had occurred because it was more difficult for women, 
who generally bear the brunt of family responsibilities, to 
work full time. The refusal to allow part time working in 
this case could indeed amount to a provision, criterion 
or practice. 
 
One of the fundamental differences between direct and 
indirect discrimination is that indirect discrimination can 
be justified. If the measure under scrutiny is a 
‗proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim‘ then 
the discrimination is not unlawful. In Hardy & Hansons 
plc v Lax [2005] IRLR 726 the claimant asked if she 
could return to work part-time following her maternity 
leave. The request was refused on the grounds that the 
employer needed a full-time employee for operational 
reasons. The tribunal felt that the employer had exag-
gerated the difficulties in allowing the claimant to return 
part time and found for her. The employer appealed ar-
guing that the tribunal should not have substituted its 
own view but should have applied a ‗band of reason-
ableness test‘. The Court of Appeal dismissed the em-
ployer‘s appeal stating that ‗it is for the tribunal to weigh 
up the real needs of the undertaking, expressed without 
exaggeration, against the discriminatory effect of the 
employer‘s proposal‘. 
 
Harassment 
 
In EOC v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
[2007] EWHC 483 the High Court ruled that the Employ-
ment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 
which amended the SDA 1975 did not properly imple-
ment the Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73/EC). As a 
result, sections 4A, (harassment) 3A and 6A (pregnancy/
maternity) had to be redrafted. 
 
The wording in the Directive and the newly drafted s 4A 
means the harassment need not be caused by the claim-
ant's sex. It includes a situation where a woman is har-
assed by conduct directed at a man or another woman. 
It can also cover the position where an employer know-
ingly allows a work environment to continue where an 
employee is subject to repeated harassment by a cus-
tomer or member of the public. 
  
Victimisation 
 
The SDA also prohibits victimisation on the grounds that 
the victim or another person has brought proceedings 
under the legislation. It is important to remember that an 
action for victimisation can only be brought in relation to 
acts which would breach the SDA in the first place. The 
case of Waters v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
[1997] IRLR 589 serves as a useful example. The em-
ployee made allegations of rape and claimed she had 
been victimised by her employer for making the allega-
tions. For the protection against victimisation to apply the 
alleged act must be one for which the employer is vicari-
ously liable. As the alleged act in this case was not com-
mitted in the course of employment the employer could 
not be held vicariously liable for it and could therefore 
not be held to have victimised the complainant for mak-
2008/06 
SDA 
 
1(2) In any circumstances relevant for the pur-
poses of a provision to which this subsection 
applies, a person discriminates against a 
woman if 
… 
(b) He applies to her a provision, criterion or 
practice which he applies or would apply 
equally to a man, but – 
i. Which puts or would put women at a par-
ticular disadvantage when compared with men 
ii. Which puts her at that disadvantage, and 
Which he cannot show to be a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim SDA s4A.  
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person subjects a 
woman to harassment if 
(a) he engages in unwanted conduct that is related to her 
sex or that of another person and has the purpose or effect 
 (i) of violating her dignity, or 
 (ii) of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, 
 humiliating or offensive environment for her, 
(b) he engages in any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature that has the purpose 
or effect— 
 (i) of violating her dignity, or 
 (ii) of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, 
 humiliating or offensive environment for her, or 
(c) on the ground of her rejection of or submission to un-
wanted conduct of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a) or 
(b), he treats her less favourably than he would treat her 
had she not rejected, or submitted to, the conduct 
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ing the allegations.  
 
However in relation to the same case the 
House of Lords considered that a claim for 
negligence on the part of the senior police 
officers arose because they did not stop the 
harassment and that this action could be 
successful.
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The Personal Scope of the Provisions 
 
The SDA applies, amongst others, to matters of employ-
ment defines employment as follows: 
The scope of equality law under the SDA is therefore 
wider than the traditional definition of employee found in 
English employment law, which relates to employment 
under a contract of service only. Equality law has a 
greater reach extending to some independent contrac-
tors as long as personal service is the dominant pur-
pose of the contract between the parties.
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Genuine Occupational Qualifications 
 
The SDA contains a list of genuine occupations qualifi-
cations which can justify discrimination on the grounds 
of sex. They can be found in S7 of the Act and relate 
primarily to questions of authenticity (e.g. in acting) and 
decency/privacy. The job may involve physical contact, 
or there may be circumstances where members of one 
sex might reasonably object to the presence of the other 
because they are in a state of undress or using sanitary 
facilities. The work may be concerned with one sex only 
and require special care, supervision or attention e.g. in 
hospitals or prisons. These exceptions will however be 
interpreted narrowly 
 
The Equality Duty 
 
The Equality Act 2006 introduced a new section 76A 
into the SDA which imposes a general and positive duty 
on Public Authorities to promote equality. They must 
have regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and 
harassment and should produce equality schemes and 
action plans to help them achieve equality in all aspects 
of their work. 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The Law provides some protection and relief for those 
employees and other workers offering personal service 
suffering from less favourable treatment on the grounds 
of their sex. The legislation covers direct and  indirect 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation. Whether 
the law, even with the new equality duty imposed on 
public authorities, actually protects victims from less fa-
vourable treatment is a debate for another day! 
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S82 (1) "employment" means employment under a 
contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract 
personally to execute any work or labour, and related 
expressions shall be construed accordingly;… 
Equality and Human Rights Commission: 
 
Instead of depending on individuals making complaints about sex discrimi-
nation, the [equality] duty places the legal responsibility on public sector 
organisations, authorities and institutions to demonstrate that they actively 
promote equality between men and women.
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